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ADJUSTING TO AN AGING LABOR FORCE
ABSTRAcI
Demographic changes in the labor force will imply that firms must change
their labor policies in the coming decades. My estimates suggest that the
labor force will get older and more female. The aging will not be as
pronounced for males as for females because the trend toward early
retirement among males will offset demographic changes. The size of the
labor force will grow until around 2015 and then will decline. Given these
changes, there are a number of issues that face employers. First,the
aging workforce may mean an increase in the size of the firm's current
deficit, defined as the difference between sales and labor cost. Second,
under these circumstances, firms may do well to invest in assets that are
highly correlated with the nominal wage bill liability. Short-term
treasury bills are a good candidate, as is, paradoxically, puttingpension
assets back in the capital of the firm itself. This strategy can reduce
the risk of bankruptcy. Third, explicit buyouts are the easiest way to
reduce the size of the elderly workforce. But this will not help the
individual firm's deficit problem. Fourth, declining ages of retirement
among males can be reversed by changes in social security policy.A
decline in real benefits and increase in the age of entitlement are likely
to have the largest effects on raising the retirement age.
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637The next few decades will witness some major changes in the composition of the
labor force. Some trends that have already become apparent are the increased labor force
participation of women and the declining ages of retirement among elderly men.' A number
of observers view earlier retirement with alarm. As the baby boom generation ages, a
larger proportion of the workforce will be in its '60s and a relatively smaller proportion in
its '30s and '40$. The implications of this change for the social security system have
already been discussed in detail. But there are effects on private firms as well. Since
older workers earn more than young, firms will become top-heavy, and will be paying a
higher average wage. Of course, to the extent that age-earnings profiles mirror age-
productivity profiles, an older workforce is also a more productive one so the rising wage
may be of no consequence. Still, life cycle theories of wages, either human capital2 or
incentive based3, imply that the relation of earnings to productivity is a loose one.
Promotion possibilities and the hierarchical structure of the firm may change as the age
distribution of workers changes. Firms may react by altering age-earnings profiles, pension
plans, explicit buyouts, and the shape of the promotion pyramid. The purpose of this paper
is to consider those reactions. Before that can be done, however, it is necessary to have a
clearer view of what the future holds. In particular, it is important first to describe the
next century's labor force.
Like most economists, I am reluctant to predict the future since I am certain to be
proven wrong. Unfortunately, the task is unavoidable if one is to discuss the way that
institutions are likely to evolve. Thus, I defend what follows with the disclaimer that
prediction is a dirty job, but someone has to do it.
'See Tuma and Sandefur (1988) for a detailed examination of trends in retirement patterns.
2As in Becker (1962).
3As in Lazear (1979).
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Labor Force, Wages and Productivity in the Decades Ahead
The first step is to project the labor force into succeeding decades.There are two
basic ingredients. First, population by age and sex must be estimatedfor each year in the
future. Second, labor force participation rates must be determined.
The Bureau of Census not only provides data on population by age for past years,
but also estimates age-specific population rates for the U.S. up through2083. Those
numbers are summarized in table 1. If the Census predictions are to be believed, twotrends
can be note& First, the proportion of the population between60 and 70 will be 4
percentage points higher for both males and females in 2020 thanit is today. Second, the
proportion between 30 and 40 will be 3 percentage points lower in 2020 thanit is today.
To get a sense of how large an impact changing population might have on the labor
force, assume that age-sex specific labor force participation rates remain what they are
currently (in l987). Using the various population weights predicted in table 1, an estimate
of the age-specific labor force participation rate for each year can be estimated. This is
done in Table 2.
No standard errors are presented in table 2 primarily because standard errors for
population estimates on which these numbers are based are unavailable. There are two main
findings. First, the proportion of the male labor force between 55and69 years old will
rise from 12% in 1990 to 18% in 2020. The proportion of the female labor force between 55
and 69 years old will rise even more dramatically, from 9% in 1990 to 17% in 2020.
Second, the proportion of the male labor force between 25 and 44 years old will shrink from
55% to 45% over the same period. Again, the same basic effect applies to women.
Additionally, the total male labor force will grow at an average rate of about 1/2 percent
4Labor force participation rates from BLS data are available for ages 16-75. All other
ages were assumed to have participation rates of zero.TABLE 1
POPULATION PROJECTIONS
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS
1983
Q 10-1920-29 30-19 40-42 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-lOOTotal
Panel A: Males
1983 17.3 19.021.617.611.910.89.1 5.11.8 114.4
1990 19.3 17.320.320.915.610.59.4 5.82.3 121.5
2000 18.6 19.717.520.520.714.89.06.5 3.1130.5
2010 18.2 19.019.917.820.319.713.06.53.8 138.0
2020 18.9 18.519.220.117.619.3 17.29.54.0 144.5
2030 18.3 19.218.819.520.016.8 16.912.65.8 147.9
2040 18.3 18.719.519.119.319.114.812.48.0 149.1
fjoortiOn oftotal population accounted for by cell
1983 0.15 0.170.190.150.100.09 0.080.040.021.00
1990 0.16 0.140.170.170.130.09 0.080.050.021.00
2000 0.14 0.150.130.160.160.11 0.070.050.021.00
2010 0.13 0.140.140.130.150.14 0.090.050.031.00
2020 0.13 0.130.130.140.120.13 0.120.070.031.00
2030 0.12 0.130.130.130.130.11 0.110.090.041.00
2040 0.12 0.130.130.130.130.13 0.100.080.051.00
Panel B: Females
IaL
1983 16.5 18.221.417.912.511.910.8 7.43.9 120.4
1990 18.5 16.519.821.116.211.411.28.5 5.1128.1
2000 17.8 18.817.020.321.115.810.69.36.8 137.5
2010 17.4 18.119.317.520.320.6 14.88.98.3 145.2
2020 18.0 17.718.619.817.619.819.212.68.7 152.1
2030 17.5 18.418.219.119.917.318.516.411.6 156.9
2040 17.5 17.818.918.719.219.5 16.215.815.8 159.4
Proportionof total population accounted for by cell
1983 0.14 0.150.180.150.100.10 0.090.060.031.00
1990 0.14 0.130.150.160.130.09 0.090.070.041.00
2000 0.13 0.140.120.150.150.12 0.080.070.051.00
2010 0.12 0.120.130.120.140.14 0.100.060.061.00
2020 0.12 0.120.120.130.120.13 0.130.080.061.00
2030 0.11 0.120.120.120.130.11 0.120.100.071.00
2040 0.11 0.110.120.120.120.12 0.100.100.101.00
Source:U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986).4
per year until 2020 and then will decline. For women,1/2 percent annual growth occurs
until 2010 and then labor force levels decline.
Of course, some key assumptions go into estimating the numbers in table 2.
Population predictions are crucial, but so is the assumption that labor force participation
rates will remain the same over time. The latter cannot not be true, especiallyfor women,
and one might hope to do better. Since data on age-specific labor force participation rates
are available over time, one can estimate age and year effects (cohort effects are
redundant) and predict age-specific LFPR's for the future. This was done by estimating
labor force participation rate trend equations (linear, quadratic, and logistic) for each age
group. Labor force participation rates can be predicted as the out-of-periodextrapolation
of the estimates. Unfortunately, as one might expect, such extrapolations are likely to be
almost uninformative. In fact, eyeballing the estimates strains even the author's imagination
for a large number of the age groups. An alternative is propose& The estimation reveals
that for all male age groups, the trend has been toward lower labor force participation rates
over time, although the change has become somewhat less dramatic recently. For females,
labor force participation rates have risen for all age groups with the exception of women
over 65. Thus, for the purposes of comparison with table 2, let us conjecture that male's
labor force participation rates will decline linearly between 1990 and 2040 to 7/8 their
current levels. Let us also conjecture that female labor force participation rates will rise
to 5/4 their current level over the same period, but impose the additional constraint that
female rates cannot exceed male rates in any given cohort. While obviously arbitrary, these
assumptions serve to illustrate the sensitivity of table 2's results to assumptions about labor
force participation rates. As before, the Census population estimates are multiplied by
estimated labor force participation rates to obtain estimated labor force sizes. Results are
contained in table 3.TABLE 2
LABOR FORCE PROJECTIONS
Labor force males, by age group n thousands
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65—69 2Q±Total
1990 4009802620689 1770811210 3845 2695 1149 542 69872
20004340739717377 2066316499 496027161057584 75593
20104460 8596 17658 1743519265 70994219 1392596 80719
2020 4144 7930 190441773716276 78005232200092581088
20304377 8072 1776019089 16616 6.38045732187 116980223
2040 4285 8244 183961783117847 71294307 1798 1041 80878
As proportion of total work force
Labor force females, by age group in thousands
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 IQ±Total
1990 3629 6651 15685142368794 2782 1881 779 327 54765
20003935612113068 1630012723 35341859699345 58586
20104038 709513262 1365214512 4947 2813 898 343 61560
2020 3753 654414268 1383712158 5296 3418 1258517 61051
2030 3964 666213314 14876 12407 43192950 1340635 60467
20403880680213786 13902 13271 48162766 109655460875





























20200.05 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.01 1.00
20300.050.100.220.24 0.210.080.060.030.011.00
20400.05 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.220.090.050.020.011.00TABLE 3
LABOR FORCE PREDICTIONS: ALTERED ASSUMPTIONS
Labor force males, by age group in thousands
16-19 20-24 253435-4445-54 55-5960-64 65-69 ZQ± Total
1990 400980262068917708 11210 384526951149542 69872
2000 4340739717377 2066316499 4960 2716 1057 584 75593
2010 44608596 1765817435192657099 4219 L392 596 80719
20204144793019044 1773716276 78005232200092581088
20304377807217760 1908916616 63804573 2187 116980223
2040 4285 824418396 1783117847 7129 4307 1798 1041 80878
As proportion of total work force






Laborforce females, byage group in thousands
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-5455-59 60-64 65-69 IQ±Total
19903629 665115685 14236 87942782 1881779327 54765
200040166427 1372117115 13360 3711 1952734 362 61399
2010405377601458815017 15963 54423094987 37767282
2020 366770701640915913 13982 60913931 1446595 69103
2030 376870001562116980 14742 518335401608762 69203
2040 3586695015723 15429 15690 60203458 .1370693 68919





2030 0.050.100.230.25 0.21 0.070.050.020.011.00
2040 0.050.100.230.220.230.09 0.050.020.011.005
Table 3 looks like table 2 in almost all respects. The graying of the labor force
that showed up in table 2 is found in table 3 as well. The aggregate labor force growth
patterns are similar to those in table 2 although growth is lower for males and higher for
females as a result of the assumptions built into table 3. The estimates in table 3 can be
contrasted with those in table 2 by subtracting table 3 results from those of table 2. The
proportion differences are contained in table 4. Proportion difference is defined as follows:
(Labor Force in cell in Table 3 -LaborForce in Cell in Table 2) /
LaborForce in cell in table 2
The differences reported in table 4 reflect the effects of changes in behavior on
labor force participation as distinguished from pure population effects.5 For example,
allowing the female labor force participation rates to rise implies that the female labor
force between 45—54 years old will be 15% higher in 2020 than it would be if rates were not
permitted to increase. To the extent that assumptions are important, obviously they are
more likely to affect estimates further out in time. Additionally, at least for women,
estimates for the older groups are more sensitive to the particular assumptions made.
A major form of behavioral change is ignored in this analysis. In particular, age-
specific wage changes brought about by changes in labor supply and complementariries in
the production function are not analyzed here.6
Both tables 3 and 4 reveal that, at least for males, the shift toward and older labor
force is not as pronounced as the shift toward an older population as shown in table 1.
The reason is that earlier retirement reduces the impact of an aging population on labor
force composition. Thus, the worker behavior is moderates the effect of pure demographics.
5Most entries for females in table 5 are positive since table 4 assumes that labor force
participation rates are going to grow. There are exceptions, however, because the rates for
females in table 4 are not permitted to exceed those for males in table 4. That constraint
is not imposed on Table 3.
6Welch (1979) and more recently Murphy and Welch (1988) have analyzed these effects
in detail.TABLE 4
PROPORTION DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
TABLE 3 AND TABLE 2
Males ______ ______ i.J.2 20-_2425-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 Total
1990 0.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00
2000 -0.02-0.02-0.03-0.03-0.03-0.02-0.02-0.03 -0.02 -0.03
2010 -0.05-0.05-0.05-0.05-0.05-0.05-0.05-0.05 -0.05 -0.05
2020 -0.08-0.07-0.07-0.07-0.08-0.07-0.08-0.08 -0.07 -0.07
2030 -0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10 -0.10 -0.10
2040 -0.12-0.12-0.12-0.12-0.12-0.13-0.12-0.13 -0.13 -0.13







Before turning away from the crystal ball, it is useful to document some changes in
pension formulas that have occurred over the years. Table Ssummarizes some important
changes.
There are two obvious changes. First, pension coverage has grown tremendously
between 1975 and 1984. There has been an increase of about 72% in the number of workers
covered which is much greater than the increase in the size of the labor force over the
same period (about 13%). Second, the proportion of plans that are of the defined benefit
type has declined dramatically. Firms are switching to definedcontribution plans and/or
firms that previously did not offer pension plans are disproportionately adopting defined
contribution plans. For reasons discussed below, it is far from obvious that this trend will
continue in the future.
To summarize this section, the major changes that firms can expect over the next
few decades is an aging of the labor force. There will be a larger proportion of workers
between ages 55 and 70 and a decline in the proportion between 25 and 44. Additionally,
there will be growth in the absolute size of the labor force until around 2015 and then a
decline. What are the impacts of these demographic shifts?
Financial Viability of the Firm:
A number of observers have already cautioned that the social security system, a
pay-as-you-go operation, may become insolvent7. These pressures are equally importaptfor
firms. As long as firms do not pay each worker his marginal product at every point in
time, unanticipated changes in the age/tenure distribution of the firm can have significant
effects. There are a number of models of life cycle wage determination which suggest that
workers are not paid their marginal products in a spot market sense. The theory of specific
7"lnsolvene' is not well defined, especially in the government context, where multiple
budget items, as well as intertemporal considerations are involved.TABLE 5
PENSIONS TRENDS
J17121k JQfl Jill 1222 .i2Q 12i. J.2.Z .L2 1984
Number of Participants in Millions:
Defined Benefit 3333.2 3536.136.8 37.9 28.9 38.6 40.1 40.9
Defined Contribution11.513.415.2 16.2 18.2 19.9 21.7 24.6 3032
Total 44.5 46.6 50.2 52.3 5557.8 50.6 63.2 70.1 72.9
Defined Benefit % 74% 71% 70% 69% 67% 66% 57% 61% 57% 56%
SOURCE.--IppoLito and Kolodrubetz, HandbookofPension Statistics 19857
human capital implies that young workers are overpaid and old workers are underpaid
relative to their marginal products.8 Incentive theories of wage determination imply the
reverse.9 Insurance theories imply that all young workers are paid less than their marginal
products and that highly able old workers are paid marginal product, whereas less able ones
are paid above their marginal products)0 As I have argued elsewhere, only incentive
theories are consistent with pervasive mandatory retirement among old workers. Specific
human capital implies the reverse, while insurance stories are implausible across ability types
because of moral hazard.11 Thus, in this section, I will assume that firms underpay young
workers relative to marginal products and overpay older ones.
Surprisingly, underpayment of young workers and overpayment of old ones implies
that competitive firms have wage bills that exceed the value of current output. (Firms
make zero profit because they enjoy the return on past investment.) An unanticipated aging
of the labor force increases that wedge and, in a pay-as-you-go operation where high
current dividends have been paid in the past, may create current cash-flow problems. This
doomsday tale is made more likely by unfulfilled expectations, which may be induced by a
demographic shift. To understand the problem, let us be somewhat more formaL
Consider an age-earnings profile, w(a), where a is age and wisthe (annual) amount
paid to a given worker. Let the worker's age-productivity profile, measured in dollars, be
q(a). Normalize so that the youngest workers are age 0 and the oldest are age I. Further,
8The classic reference is Becker (1962).
9See Lazear (1979).
'°See Harris and Holmsirom (1982).
1Highly able workers would shirk, passing themselves off as low ability ones to collect
the insurance premium. Additionally, empirical analyses have found that most wage variation
is individual specific, which suggests that far from perfect insurance is found. See Lillard
and Weiss (1979).8
let the distribution of worker ages within the firm at time tbegiven by f(a)andlet the
size of the work force be N. The wage bill of the firm at time Iisthen given by
(1) W —N 5 w(a)f(a)da
andtotal output at time tisgiven by
(2)Q— Nfq(a)f(a)da




Whena worker is hired into the firm, competitive markets ensure that Lifetime
wages paid to the worker equal lifetime output. This means that
f'w(a)eda —5 q(a)eda
or
(4)f(w(a) -q(a))eda — 0,
If eq. (4) holds, then it cannot be true generally that the wage bill equals output at each
point in time. Only if f(a) —ewould the wage bill equal current period output.
Suppose, for example, that all workers join the firm at age 0 and do not leave until
age 1. Suppose further that the firm hires the same number of individuals each period.9
Then f(t)— 1for all t and wages exceed output for any positive interest rate. How can
this be? The firm pays back in each period what it gained during the first few periods of
its operation. This is not unlike pay-as-you-go social security. There, the first generation
receives more than it puts in. Here, the firm pays interest on the "advance" that it
received in early periods and the interest just covers the value of the advance. Workers
are essentially holding their firm's bonds. By accepting less than they are worth when
young, they buy bonds which are paid back as wages that exceed marginal product when
they are old. The difference between current wages and current output reflects the average
return on bonds held by the workers. This is true even though the average age of
individuals in the firm is constant in steady state, and even though the distribution of
worker ages within the firm is uniform.
As interesting as this may be, it is far from obvious that the finn must have
negative net revenues or cash flow. If anything, the presumption goes the other way. The
reason is that current cash flow depends on what the firm did with the capital that it
received in earlier periods when workers were receiving less than average output on net. If
the firm took the surplus received each period on every worker and put it, say, in a bond
paying r rate of interest or invested it in the firm where the rate of return is at least r,
then in a deterministic world, it would always have exactly enough to cover the difference
between wages and output. If, on the other hand, the firm paid the surplus as dividends to
current stock holders then it would face the problem of not being able to meet payroll in
steady state.'2 There are two ways that problems can arise. First, some myopia may be
present. Required is an inability to smooth receipts and payments over time appropriately.
In this respect, the current problem has much in common with the labor market insurance
12Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that an acquisition of one firm by another
allows for less costly breach of the implicit promise made by old management to its work
force.
An omniscient stock market would see through this and purchasers of the stock
would take into account future liabilities of the firm that take the form of promises to workers.10
literature.13 This line is pursued first, not because we hold that the world is deterministic,
but because this proves useful for comparison with the stochastic environment.
A changing demographic structure may be a catalyst for myopia in the deterministk
context. Suppose that the supply of young labor rises and there is a concomitant increase
in demand for the average firm's product. Nothing has caused the firm to change the shape
of the age-earnings profile and the age-productivity profile is similarly unaltered. If the
typical firm anticipates that the inflow of workers has changed permanently, then the pay-
as-you-go mentality means that the firm is expecting next generation's workers to support
(at least in part) this generation by accepting wages less than marginal product. A
reversion to the previous levels of population growth will cause a current deficit for this
firm which has mistakenly assumed that the increase in young person labor supply is
permanent. Again, what makes this go is that firms have already spent the windfall that
they received when the size of the young workforce increased above expected. (Recall
young workers receive less than they produce so the firm accumulates a surplus.) Let us be
somewhat more formal.
First it is shown that an aging labor force implies an increase in the current deficit
(ignoring return on other accumulated assets). An elderly baby-boom generation can be
parameterized as
(5) f(a) —Ac0for a .ca
—k1 for aa




To show that an aging baby boom generation increases the difference between wage
bill and current output, it is sufficient to show that
(7)N f(w(a) -q(a)]da < iVk0f(w(a)- q(a)]da+Nk1f(w(a) -q(a)]da
(still assuming, for simplicity, that all workers enter the firm at age 0 and leave at age 1).
The l.h.s. is the deficit in the firm with a uniform age distribution. The r.h.s. is the deficit





Sincew(a)— q(a)isincreasing in a,
R S
(8) a<(l —a)
Note further that (6) can be rewritten as
aSk1-l
1—a 1—k0













by (6), which is a contradiction. I/I
Thisproof means that an aging labor force increases the firm's current deficit when
the boom generation reaches old age when population size is fixed at N.14 Again, two
ingredients are necessary to make this a concern in a deterministic environment. First, the
14The effect is reduced somewhat if generations that succeed the baby boom are of
previous size, rather than small enough to keep population constant. But the point still
holds.13
firm must operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. Second. the firm must dissipate the excess
that it receives as a result of having a larger than equilibrium young workforce.15
At the heart of this problem is what firms are able to forecast and how they save
for the future. Whether poor planning by firms will create difficulties in a pay-as-you-go
world is an empirical question. The business community's concern over cash-flow and
dividend policies have puzzled economists ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) put forth
their famous theorem. In this context, only the most naive and myopic firms should find
the current deficit an important variable. A more plausible alternative is that the world is
not deterministic.
The firm can only assure that receipts equal payments in a deterministic world. But
returns on investments are stochastic so that receipts are unlikely to match payments ever.
Even a dedicated bond portfolio will not do the job. The reason is that the liability to the
worker is real, whereas the dedicated bond portfolio guarantees only a nominal payment.
Indeed, the frequently suggested dedicated portfolio strategy is likely to cause a larger
standard deviation between receipts and payments than other investment strategies, in
particular, the strategy of investing in short term securities, like six month treasury bills.
The reason is that short—term nominal interest rates are more closely correlated with
nominal wage growth than are long-term rates.
Although there may be no investment strategy that guarantees that nominal liability
equals nominal receipts, this does not imply that a pay-as-you-go structure increases risk of
bankruptcy. Pay-as-you-go would have the excess of receipts over payments paid out as
dividends or reinvested. Shortfalls are made up by selling off capital (physical or
securities).
15A permanent population increase from NtoNcausesan increase deficit without any
need for an aging labor force. This follows directly from (3). But deficit per worker,
which is independent of N,isnot increased. In some sense, the normalized deficit increases
only when the age distribution shifts.- 14
Define the pay as you go strategy as taking the current generation's loan, i.e., the
difference between output and wage payment to young workers, and investing it in the firm.
Then the firm uses its resulting output to pay off the generation of old workers. If the
firm is trying to minimize the probability of bankruptcy or simply trying to minimize the
variance of the deficit, the it may well be better to invest all money in the firm and use
the pay-as-you-go strategy. Let us formalize this as follows:
Consider two periods. The firm collects X from the worker in period 1 and
promises to pay real wage W in period 2. The real wage is set so that the worker earns
the appropriate real return on his investment and so that the worker bears no real risk.
(All risk is borne by the risk-neutral firm in this contract.) If W were non-stochastic, then
a dedicated portfolio of X of bonds yielding nominal rate r would exactly cover the current
deficit. So if Qisoutput in period 2,
W -Q — X(l+r)
when W and Qequaltheir expectations. Put alternatively, the amount that the worker
lends the firm is, in equilibrium,
x-
1+r
where W and Qareexpected values.
An alternative strategy is to take the proceeds collected from the worker in period
1 and to reinvest in the firm. This is equivalent to raising the scale of the firm to W/Q so
long as output from the new capital moves in proportion to the old capital. Then, when W
—Wand Q— Q, theamount invested should increase Qproportionately,i.e., by15
The deficit, if the expectation is realized, is then
W-Q1+
=0.
In general, however, IV is not identically equal to W and Qisnot equal to Q.The
seemingly low variance dedicated portfolio strategy is likely to be worse than the "high
risk" strategy of reinvesting in output and paying as you go.
The deficit in period 2 is
D aW-Q + X(1+r)
with the dedicated portfolio and
-W--F










w WP -— QR
W(P -R).
Thus,
=W24 + - 2cov(WP, QR)
and
—W2[4 +'4 - 2cov(P, R)].
If P and R are uncorrelated so that cov(P, R) —0,then the dedicated portfolio is
the lower-risk strategy since QcW2. But, in general, P and R are positively correlated.
At the other extreme, let P —R.Then D is equal to zero always. But if P R,




The dedicated portfolio has higher variance and the pay-as-you-go strategy is better. The
best hedge is an instrument that is highly correlated with W -Q, e.g.,short-term bonds, or
perhaps better, the firm's stock, since it picks up firm idiosyncratic risk. Pension funds
often hold a large proportion of their firms' stock, despite the adverse consequences on
diversifiàation.16 The reason may be that reinvesting pension funds in the firm reduces the
risk of bankruptcy, which affects the expected wage payment.
'6As long as stock price is only miniminally affected by factors other than current
output, holding stock reduces risk of bankruptcy and pension default. But stock price varies
in ways unrelated to current output, which works against holding pension dollars in real
assets of the firm.17
The policy that seems to work as a way to guarantee that the firm does not run a
deficit in period 2 does not guarantee zero deficit at all. Indeed, it may be worse than a
pay-as-you-go strategy that puts everything into and takes everything out of the firm. The
reason is that the commitment to the worker is a real liability whereas the dedicated
portfolio is a guaranteed nominal asset.
This discussion has direct bearing on pension liabilities. Even "funded" pensions
have a portfolio that is attempting to cover a liability, the value of which is a random
variable. If Wisredefined to be pension liability and Qisdefined as the realization of the
pension portfolio set aside to cover that liability, then the analysis is identical. This
implies that the dedicated portfolio strategy, where assets are purchased to match the
payout structure or average duration of the estimated liability, may actually be the worst
way to hedge. Because the value of the fund does not vary with the liability, the deficit
increases when the net nominal liability increases to keep real value constant. This is
surprising since some influential pension investment advisors recommend long bonds as a
hedging strategy. Short-term treasury bills, the value of which moves more with the rate
of price and wage inflation, are likely to be a better hedge. Since the pension liability is a
real one (almost all defined benefit plans are tied directly or indirectly to final salary), a
certain nominal return is a poor hedge for that liability.'7
-
Themain point is that even forward looking firms may find themselves in dire
straits as a result of output that is too low to cover its wage bill. The pay-as-you-go
strategy may be the best that one can do, but it still is not good enough to prevent
bankruptcy when liabilities are random variables. Virtually all defined benefit pension plans
and implicit wage commitments are, at least to some extent, real liabilities which are
affected by unpredictable events.
'7A11 of this begs the question of why a firm wants to hedge part or all of iiability
to any one group.18
Is this an important issue? Put alternatively, how large are the potential deficits
relative to the wage bill? In order to know, it is necessary to have some idea about the
difference between output and wages over tie lifecycle. The following example makes the
point that small initial deviations of output and wage can result in large steady state
deficits.
Suppose that the work life is 45 years and that the worker's output in each of
those years is $30,000. Suppose that a linear wage profile is used with wage at time zero
equal to 5/6 of marginal product. It is easily verified that if the discount rate is 2% real,
the following wage function ensures that the worker receives the present value of lifetime
marginal product ($820,660) over his career
W(t) 25,000 +2801
where : is year of employment and runs from I to 45. To convert to nominal dollars, let
the inflation rate be 5% so that by the end of the first year, nominal q is $31,500 and
nominal salary is $26,544. The final nominal salary is $254,848. Salary overtakes marginal
product in the 18th year of work, or with 60% of the career remaining. If the distribution
of work ages is uniform as before, then the average deficit per worker is $7783 per year,
which is slightly less than 8% of the worker's average (undiscounted) wage. That is, the
firm's steady state deficit equals about 8% of its wage bill. As compared with pension
liability figures, the number is significant18.
Incidentally, there is an irony in that the most productive firms may also run the
largest deficit. If the difference between slope of the wage profile and slope of the
productivity profile is positively related to output, as it might be for incentive reasons, then
high output firms will have the largest deficit. The current deficit reflects larger bond
purchases by workers, which raise worker productivity over the lifecycle.
'8See Ippolito (1986).-
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Now suppose that a firm finds itself in a situation where it cannot meet its payroll.
What can the firm do?
First, it can breach its contracts. The breach can take a number of forms. As
already mentioned (Shleifer and Summers (1987)), bankruptcy and reopening under new
management may allow for an inexpensive way to breach acontract.'9 To the extent that
bankruptcy or reorganization through mergers and acquisitions involve some social cost as a
result of inefficient rent seeking, this alternative is not desirable. Whether transfers in
ownership increase with the (unanticipated) aging of the firm's work force has not yet been
documented.
Why not lower the wages of the generation of young that follows the baby boomers
to cover the deficit? That strategy is not feasible in a competitive labor market. It
implies that the current young workers are willing to subsidize older workers. Competing
firms can offer each new worker his lifetime marginal product, as defined by (4). Bygones
are bygones and firms cannot make up for mistakes of the past by attempting to extract
additional concessions from workers of the future. Promising even higher wages in the
future to the new generation of young workers is not credible because that would imply
further attacks on next generations young workers.
As Welch (1979) argued and MaCurdy and Mroz (1988) and Berger (1988) most
recently corroborated, wage profiles depend on cohort size. In particular, age-earnings
profiles for the peak baby boom cohort are flatter than those of other groups. Their age-
real earnings profiles are actually negatively sloped during the 1970s, even though baby
boomers were going through the part of lifecycle when real wages are expected to grow
most rapidly. Berger offers evidence of flatter profiles for baby boomers. The firm may be
adjusting to the pay-as-you-go formula. The present value of lifetime earnings need notfall
19Still, it can be argued that there is no obvious reason why new owners are better
able to breach than old ones. This is especially true when there is separation of ownership
and control.20
much since there are more baby boomers than current older workers so that the deficit
covered by a small amount withheld per worker on more workers. The converse holds when
the baby boomers are older. But lifetime productivity would be expected to fall if the
earlier profile provided incentives which are now reduced as a result of flatter profiles.
Perhaps the most likely solution to current deficits (and the one that comes closest
to the topic at hand) involves changing the retirement behavior of the baby boomers. If
older workers are paid more than they.are worth, then lowering the average retirement age
improves the firm's current cash flow situation. There are a number of ways that this can
be accomplished.
First are explicit buyouts. Let us assume that the firm wants to reduce the size of
its older work force, either for the reasons discussed above or for any other reason. For
example, older workers may possess obsolete human capital that has little value to the firm.
If this reduces their marginal products below the alternative use of their time, a separation
is efficient. The separation can be brought about by severance pay that takes the form of
an explicit buyout.
Using the notation above, suppose a worker of age a0hasw(a0)>q(a0). Suppose
further that the firm would "prefer" that he leave, either for reasons of cash flow or for
efficient separation. How can this be accomplished while saving the firm money?
Let the worker's alternative use of time be given by w(a). To buy out a worker
of age a0 it is necessary to offer a buyout Bsuchthat
(10) B>f[w(a) - ;v(a)]eda.
Inorder for the firm to make money on the buyout, it is necessary that
(Il) B< f[w(a) - q(a)Jeda.21
Eqq.(10) and (11) implythat
(12) f[v(a)-q(a)]eda>0.
Condition (12) isthe efficiency condition for separation over the remainder of the
worker's life. It says that a profitable buyout offer can be made only when a separation
would be efficient, that is, only when the worker's alternative use of time exceeds his value
to the firm. This is significant.
Suppose that the reason that the firm would like to rid itself of the worker is that
his human capital has become obsolete. This implies that the q(a) profile has shifted
downward, or has tilted to become less positively or more negatively sloped. If internal
productivity falls more than external productivity, which is likely especially when the
alternative use of time reflects the value of leisure, then condition (12) is more likely to be
met. Thus, profitable explicit buyouts are a feasible strategy in some cases where worker
skills have become obsolete.
Now suppose that the q(a) profile has not fallen over time, but that the firm would
like to become less "top-heavy" for cash-flow reasons. Buyouts offer no relief here. In
order to buy the worker out, it must be true that (12) holds. But the retirement date a'
(in this case aS —1)must have been chosen in any cx ante efficient contract to solve
(13) v(a') —q(a').
Forall a .c a', q(a) >v(a)so that condition (12) must be violated unless something else
has changed. A changing demographic structure does not necessarily imply that q(a) falls
relative to v(a) for high values of a. The change in the shape of the productivity profile
depends on imperfect substitution across age categories and the nature of their interaction
in the production function (see Murphy and Welch (1988)). As a result, it is unlikely that a22
current deficit caused by a demographic shift can be alleviated by an explicit buyout of
older workers.
Pensions and Implicit Buyouts:
As I have argued earlier20, worker turnover can be affected by using a defined
benefit pension plan. These plans have the feature that expected present value of the
pension stream declines, once workers remain with the firm beyond some date. Thus, the
pension acts as severance pay since remaining for an additional year costs the worker
benefits. Specifically, what the worker receives at time a.jis
(14) Compensation (a0) —w(a0) + ,Pension(a0).
By selecting the appropriate defined benefit pension formula, any desired buyout structure
can be achieved. For example, suppose the interest rate is zero and a given individual is
going to live to age 80. He began working for the firm at age 30. Suppose further that
the firm would like to offer him a buyout of 511,000 at age 60. Let the firm offer the
following (standard) pension formula
The worker receives ($l000Xyears of service at retirement) per year during every
year that he lives after retirement.
If the worker retires at age 60, he has 30 years of service and receives 530,000 per year
times 20 years or $600,000 in pension. If he retires at 61, he has 31 years of service and
receives $31,000 per year times 19 years or 1589,000 in pension. The difference in pension
is $11,000 so it costs the worker $11,000 to stay on one more year. The pension formula
has produced a the desired buyout at age 60.
While both common types of defined benefit pension formulas (pattern and
conventional) can achieve any desired buyout structure, a defined contribution pension plan
20See Lazear (1983).23
offers no potential for a buyout. Since defined contribution plans become the assets of the
workers and since contributions to the fund cannot be negative21, there is no possibility of
structuring a contribution schedule such that the expected present value of the pension
assets decline with years of work.22
The advantage of explicit buyouts over implicit ones is that the amount can be
tailored to each case. But there are two problems with explicit buyouts. Explicit buyouts
may create a moral hazard problem as workers try to make themselves undesirable so that
the firm will increase the buyout offer. Additionally, they may be illegal. Explicit buyout
programs are offered to workers in some age window, say, 55 to 59 years old. The firm
may not want to offer as large a buyout to workers who are, say 65, because the older
workers have a higher probability of voluntary retirement in a given year (see Karlen v.
City College of Chicago, U.S. 7th Circuit, R. Posner). But at least one court has ruled that
this discriminates on the basis of age. Since 65yearolds are not entitled to a benefit that
56yearolds receive, they are adversely affected in a way that is related to age and not
necessarily productivity. While the move makes good economic sense and may be efficient,
courts have not always viewed economic efficiency as the relevant criterion.
Explicit buyouts create moral hazard. A worker who can depress his output, q(a),
byreducing effort can make it cx post profitable for a firm to buy him out. The worker
who knows that behaves opportunistically, which can be prevented only by making buyout
offers unanticipated. Each offer must be a once-and-for-all offer and workers must not
infer from it that similar offers will be available to them in the future. This is a difficult
21This is true not only in practice, but as a result of recent court interpretations of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In fact, contributions may not even fall
off as a function of age according to the court ruling.
22Clark, Gohmann, and McDermed (1988) find that defined benefit plans are more
prevalent in large and unionized firms. They interpret this finding as Consistent with a
pensions—as—severance-pay interpretation.24
lie to tell continuously, especially since the worker knows that, cx post, it pays for the
firm to buckle under and buy the worker out.
Implicit buyouts that operate through defined benefit pension plans may be equally
"illegal," but they are more subtle. As such, firms are likely to be able to use them with
relative impunity. (There are obvious exceptions. Courts have already ruled that explicit
service credit may not cease when a worker reaches some age, say, 65.) Thus, a switch
from a defined contribution to defined benefit plan may be the right approach in
occupations where retirement can occur on the job.
Table 5 now becomes particularly relevant. The trend reflects a shift from defined
benefit plans toward defined contribution plans over time. There are a number of
advantages of using defined contribution plans. They are easy to administer and cheap to
subcontract out to third parties. More important, they usually offer workers more choice
over the instruments used as investment vehicles in the pension fund. The major
disadvantage is that they cannot be used as effectively to influence the retirement decision.
Of course, if wages can be reduced, there is no need to use subtle pension buyout schemes
to bring about retirement. But not only might wage reductions be viewed as breaches of
implicit contracts, they are almost certainly a violation of ADEA. The same statute makes
obsolete the use of mandatory retirement as a tool for adjusting the labor force, which
means that implicit buyouts through defined benefit pension plans are even more important.
Yet firms seem to be switching voluntarily to defined contribution plans, or at least new
plans are disproportionately of this type. How can this be reconciled with the previous
argument?
First, it is well known that the average age of retirement has fallen over time, at
least for men. Table 6 presents some labor force participation rates.
For men, the decline in labor force participation rates among the older work force
is quite pronounced. No similar pattern exists for females because two trends operate inTABLE 6
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OVER TIME
M.n Women
55-64 65+ 55-64 65+
1970 76 22 41 8
1980 72 19 41 8
1985 68 16 42 725
opposite directions. Career women may be retiring earlier than in the past, but younger
cohorts have higher average participation rates, which drives up the average, even for the
55-64agegroup.
There is some evidence23 that the elimination of mandatory retirement will have a
small effect on reducing that trend, but this may be a short run phenomenon that pertains
only to those workers whose wage offers were altered significantly by the unanticipated
elimination of mandatory retirement. There are some occupations where elimination of
mandatory retirement is likely to present significant problems. The most obvious of these is
academics. Here, the working conditions are not well defined so a worker may remain with
the firm, doing relatively little, and still draw his normal salary. Because the pension is
defined contribution, and is an owned by the worker (against which he may even borrow),
there is no way that the pension can be used to induce him to retire. Universities have
become quite concerned that this will create a major problem and there has already
accumulated evidence which suggests reason for concern. At the University of Chicago, for
example, since the retirement age was raised from 65 to 70, only one individual (an
economist) opted to retire before 70.24 Is this an issue and how can firms in this situation
deal with it?
Explicit and implicit buyout strategies are available. But the social and even
private cost associated with a failure to induce individuals to retire may not be that great.
When a tenure decision is made at 30, the firm must consider that the worker has an
expected retirement age of, say, 73, rather than 65.Thepresent value of the extra salary
cannot be that large at the time the tenure decision is made, even more so if the shape of
the age-earnings profile can be altered to recapture some of the additional lifetime earnings.
The true social cost is that retirement does not occur at the right age because workers are
23See Morrison (1988) for a review of the evidence.
24Sherwin Rosen's committee on mandatory retirement (1988) provided the anecdotal evidence26
paidmorethan they are worth and the wage may exceed the reservation wage. But the
difference between the value of true leisureandacademic productivity plus leisuretakenin
one's final years as an academic maynotbethatlarge.
Toomuchor too littleearly retirement?
Observershave been somewhat schizophrenic about retirement patterns. Some worry
that there will be too many older workers and that there will be a need to induce them to
leave the labor market. Others fear that early retirement patterns will Continue and that
aggregate output, ignoring leisure, will be too low. I believe that the issue will be one of
having a top—heavy labor market for the following reasons.
First, the size of the labor force will be increasing steadily between 1990 and 2020,
both for males and females. Despite a trend toward declining participation rates among
elderly males, which is in a rough way built into the male panel of table 3, the male labor
force 60 and older will increase from 4.4 million in 1990 to 7.5 million in 2020. This is an
increase of 72% over a 30 year period.
Second, even the labor force participation rate for the group as a whole is
estimated to rise between 1990 and 2020. To the extent that workers across age categories
are imperfect substitutes for one another, it is unlikely that such large increases in the
elderly labor force will not depress older worker productivity so that earlier retirement
becomes efficient. If old and middle aged workers were good substitutes for one another,
then a stronger case could be made that the firms will want to retain, rather than discard
older workers. Welch's (1979) and subsequent authors' evidence suggests that imperfect
substitution is important since an increase in the size of a cohort does not have age-neutral
effects on wages. This is significant because the male aggregate labor force participation
rate is projected to decline from about 77% to about 70% by 2020. The decline occurs as
the age distribution of males shift toward older and lower participation rate cells. It is27
perhaps this decline in labor force participation rates that has caused some to view with
alarm the labor market of the future.
Third, the trend for women goes the other way with the participation rate rising by
the same amount as the male decline, to about 63% by 2020. Female rates rise because the
effect of younger cohorts having higher labor force participation rates outstrips the adverse
consequence of a shifting age distribution.25Additionally, the imperfect substitutability
implies that inducing older males to work may not be much help even if there is a real
"shortage" of labor.
Working in the opposite direction, however, are projected changes in the social
security system. Most obvious are changes in age of entitlement, earnings test, and pension
payments associated with the social security system. Those effects cannot be captured by
past data because many of the changes are not scheduled for years to come. Reduced
benefits and increased age of entitlement work toward increasing labor.force participation
among the elderly so table 3 probably understates the aging of the labor force by ignoring
these changes.
Exogenous shifts in the social security system, say, by changing age of entitlement,
imply that the privately optimal retirement date must rise.26 It is privately inefficient to
attempt to cifset the effects of this change by encouraging older workers to retire. Thus,
exogenous shifts in the social security system offer an example of a situation where firms
will not use changes in pension formulas or age-earnings profiles to induce early retirement.
This is the opposite case of the one considered in the previous section. There, it was
25The Census population projections are extrapolated from 1983. The weights that are
used to obtain aggregate and age-group labor force participation rates are derived from
these population estimates. There is reason to believe that they are already off by a
reasonable amount since they predict somewhat higher than actual labor force participation
rates for the current year.
26Privately optimal means that the firm and worker perform joint maximization so as
to induce the worker to leave when worker output falls below his alternative use of time,
which includes the social security payment.28
assumed that older workers had obsolete human capital which meant a fall in productivity
relative to alternative use of time and therefore an earlier optimal retirement date. Here,
the alternative use of time falls between 65and68 as a result of a higher age of
entitlement. This raises productivity relative to alternative use of time and therefore
implies a later retirement date.
Other Institutional Factors
Pensions:
A major consideration when demographics change are the impacts of the change on
the pension liability. Much of the gloom over the social security system relates to
projections that the baby boom generation will imply too much in benefits to be supported
by the younger generation. This is because the social security system has unfunded liability.
Pensions plans with unfunded liability may be in serious trouble if the young generation
declines relative to the old.
The earlier discussion has already debunked the notion that a dedicated portfolio of
long-term bonds is a perfect or even good hedge. This means that a changing demographic
structure has important implications for the solvency of pension funds, even if those funds
are fully "funded." To the extent that a shift toward an aging work force and a shrinking
younger population increases the variance of the difference between current output and
current payments (which include pension payments), bankruptcy will become more common.
To reduce the probability of bankruptcy, a strategy of holding short-term assets, the
nominal value of which is highly correlated with nominal liabilities, can be followed.
Whether firms will actually adopt such a strategy is a real question.27
27The macroeconomic implications of an economy-wide adoption of the short-term
strategy are well beyond the scope of this paper and this author.29
Promotions and the Shape of the Pyramid:
Tables 3 and 4 reveal an aging labor force. The typical firm will have a larger
proportion of its workforce in the 55-69 age category. This implies either that the
probability of promotion will fall at the top of the hierarchy and rise at the lower levels or
that the shape of the typical firm's pyramid will change. A pyramid with steeper sides will
be necessary to keep all promotion probabilities the same. A proliferation of high level jobs
can be expected if wages must be tied to jobs as Carmichael (1983) suggests. Otherwise,
the shape of the age-earnings profile must change. Does changing the shape of the pyramid
have any real consequence? Normally, economists do not worry about jobs, per se, and the
question, What is a job,. is too deep to be addressed here.28 If tasks are somehow aligned
with jobs and are inseparable in the production function, then a cost of having a changing
workforce is that the task structure of the firm will be altered somewhat. Carmichael
suggests an incentive compatibility reason for having wages tied to jobs, but not for having
the tasks assigned specifically to job titles. There seems little reason why the duties that
are currently assigned to vice director of management information systems cannot be those
that were previously under the direction of assistant vice director. The task breakdown in
the firm would then be identical, except that many tasks were previously performed by
younger workers with lesser job titles.
Teaching
The last point suggests some potential for real effects of a changing age
distribution. Since tasks are not necessarily performed equally well by all age groups, it is
unlikely that the new age distribution of tasks and the old one result in the same
productivity. But there is no presumption that average productivity will fall. For example,
28A less-than-satisfactory effort was made in Lazear and Rosen (1988). There jobs
were defined to be technologically determined investment opportunities.30
older workers may be better teachers and previous productivity may have been lower
because of fewer qualified teachers. One possibility is that older workers have a larger
amount of obsolete skills. Another is that they are the creators of skills in younger
workers. A changing age distribution can have real effects on productivity, but the
changing the hierarchical structure of the firm should not necessarily have any effect on
productivity.
Women in the Labor Marker
Women are becoming more like men in their labor force participation patterns.
Female participation rates not only have risen, but also have smoothed Out over the
lifecycle, no longer exhibiting the two-humped pattern of the 1950s in the aggregate data.
The smoothness in the aggregate data probably overstates the extent to which women have
ceased to interrupt their careers, at least temporarily, upon child bearing.29 The growing
importance of women in the market may help explain the move from defined benefit to
defined contribution plan.
Women have a relatively greater demand for not merely vested pension plans, but
portable ones. Consider a defined benefit pension plan that vests immediately, but is not
portable. A split career, where a worker works at two different firms for 20 years each,
results in lower pension than a unified career, where a worker works at one firm for 40
years. This is because pension benefits are tied to final salary and salary at age 45 is
likely to be lower than that at age 65. (Even pattern plans have ad hoc adjustments that
are generally not awarded to vested, separated employees.) This is a greater concern to
women than to men since women are more likely to have a split career than men. A
portable pension is one that credits summed work experience and ignores movements across
29Those data confound effects of cohort-specific labor force entry ages and cohort
specific mother's age at childbirth so smoothing can result from averaging bi-humped
patterns over different groups.31
employers. Most professors have portable plans. TIAA/CREF is widespread and most
universities are subscribers. But that is unnecessary. Even if a professor were to move
from a TIAA/CREF institution to a non-TIAA/CREF defined contribution institution, the
pension would be portable in that no penalty is suffered for a job change. Contributions
are made on a monthly basis and only the value of assets determines the pension. It is
independent of the identity of the employer, as is social security.30 In fact, portability is a
general characteristic of defined contribution plans, which suggests that women have a
relative preference for them. The growth in defined contribution plans may well be a
response to increased average turnover in the labor market that accompanies the larger
proportion of the labor force comprised of females. As already discussed above, what is
sacrificed by moving to defined contribution plans is the ability to influence retirement
decisions by adjusting pension formulas.
Conclusion
Some adjustments will be necessary as firms adapt to the impacts of demographic
changes on the composition and size of the labor force. The first task is to predict the
ways in which the labor force is likely to change. The major prediction for labor force
changes are: First, the labor force will get older. The proportion of workers between 60
and 70 years old will increase 4 percentage points between 1990 and 2020 and there will be
a corresponding decline in the proportion between ages 30 and 40. Second, the aging of the
labor force will not be as pronounced for males as females, because the trend toward earlier
retirement will offset demographic changes. This is true despite the elimination of
mandatory retirement. Third, the size of the labor force will grow until about 2015 and
then will decline. Given these trends, the following points are relevant:
30Exceptions include moving to government jobs, which are not part of the social
security system.32
1. In steady state, a firm doesnotcover itswagebill by current output.The
deficit must be made up by returns on previous investments. The size of the firm's current
deficit grows when the labor force ages.
2. Hedging the pension liability by using a dedicated portfolio of long-term bonds
is trying to cover the promised real wage bill with assets that guarantee nominal returns.
The strategy is unlikely to be successful. A superior strategy, and one that may be adopted
to a greater extent as labor force demographics change, is covering liabilities by investing
in assets that are highly correlated with the value of the nominal liability. Short-term
treasury bills are a good candidate. Even better may be reinvestment in the firm, but
changing demographics can have important effects when this strategy is used.
3. A firm that desires to reduce the size of its older workforce may consider
explicit buyouts. An explicit buyout is feasible only when productivity falls below the
alternative use of time. The wage is irrelevant and this implies that bu.youts cannot be used
to alleviate deficit problems.
4. Implicit buyouts, through strategically designed pension formulas, have the
advantages over explicit ones that workers are less likely to reduce effort to increase the
buyout offer and that they are less likely to be found in violation of ADEA. The
disadvantage is that the buyout cannot be tailored to the individual as easily.
5. Defined benefit plans offer implicit buyout features that are absent in defined
contribution plans. As a result, firms may shift back toward defined benefit plans in the
future. This is particularly true for occupations where the elimination of mandatory
retirement will have the largest impact. One explanation of the recent trend toward defined
contribution plans is the growing importance of females in the labor force, who have a
relative preference for portable plans.
6. While most evidence points toward declining age of retirement, the major
exogenous factor working in the opposite direction is the change in the social security33
system. A decline in real benefits and an increase in age of entitlement work to raise the
optimal retirement age.
7. There is may be a proliferation of high level jobs, but the task distribution need
not change.
8. Aging is likely to have effects on average productivity, but the direction of the
change is not obvious. This depends on complementarities in the production function, among
other things.REFERENCES
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